Equality of opportunity, equality of positions: what separates them

The first consists in equalising the starting points: making sure that social origin, place of birth or sex do not determine the position one will occupy. One then acts on access, selection, information, schooling. Gaps at the finish remain acceptable, provided the competition was fair.

The second consists in reducing the gap between the positions themselves: making the distance between the best and the least well provided for smaller, whatever the way one got there. One then acts on incomes, protections, working conditions. The sociologist François Dubet proposed naming these two logics equality of opportunity and equality of positions.

Both aim at equality and do not necessarily contradict each other. They come into competition as soon as a budget or a rule has to be settled, because a euro devoted to improving access to a scarce position is not devoted to narrowing the gap between existing positions.

Equality of opportunity legitimises the gaps that remain: if the race was fair, the result is deserved. Its supporters see in it a powerful principle, which respects individual choices and efforts. Its critics see in it an elegant way of justifying considerable gaps, and a system in which failure becomes a personal fault.

Equality of positions attacks the gaps directly, which makes it more tangible for the people concerned. Its supporters stress that a less exposed position makes mobility less vital: if positions are less unequal, the stake of winning the race falls. Its critics reply that by reducing the gap one weakens the incentive to effort and the recognition of contributions.

One point is often neglected in this debate: equality of opportunity, pushed to its conclusion, requires very strong interventions in family life and in schooling, which makes it far less liberal than it looks. Neither of the two logics is the camp of liberty against that of constraint.

Work on social mobility, which follows the link between the parents' position and that of the children, shows that this link remains marked in most societies, including where access to education has broadly opened up. No country has reached a situation in which origin would no longer influence trajectory.

These findings are used by both camps, and legitimately. Supporters of equality of opportunity see in them proof that one must act more strongly on access. Supporters of equality of positions see in them proof that acting on access alone is not enough, and that gaps must be narrowed for origin to weigh less.

Asking “are you in favour of equality” does not separate these two positions: almost nobody answers no. Distinguishing them presupposes concrete situations, in which one must choose between improving access to a scarce position and reducing the gap between existing positions.

Many people hold to both, and that is not an inconsistency. The useful question is not which you choose in principle, but which you favour when they come into conflict, which happens as soon as a budget or a rule has to be settled.

Take a measure that clearly improves the access of a small number of people to a highly sought-after position, without changing anything for the others. Then a measure that modestly improves the situation of a large number, without making access to scarce positions easier. Which seems the fairer to you?

The answer does not say whether you are right, it says which of the two equalities you lean towards when a decision has to be made. That is exactly what a well-built dimension measures, and it is often more illuminating than any label.