Representing: carrying voters' voices or judging in their place?
Should an elected representative do what those who elected them want, or what they judge to be right for them? Both answers have had staunch defenders for more than two centuries.
Two conceptions of the mandate
In the first, the representative is a delegate. They have received a specific mission and must keep to it, like an agent who acts on behalf of another and must answer to them. Their legitimacy comes from faithfulness to the expectations of those who chose them.
In the second, the representative is a trustee. They are entrusted with a judgement rather than an instruction, and must be able to depart from their voters' opinion when they consider that the voters' interest, or that of the whole, requires it.
The argument from independence
Edmund Burke gave it a famous formulation in his speech to the electors of Bristol, in 1774. He argues there that a parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, and not a congress of ambassadors charged with defending opposing local interests.
Defenders of this conception add a practical argument. The representative has information the voter lacks, circumstances change after the election, and deliberation only makes sense if everyone can be persuaded in the course of the discussion.
The argument from faithfulness
Supporters of the delegate mandate reply that independence quickly becomes a pretext. A representative free of any instruction can drift durably away from those they represent, and the next election corrects too late a gap that has long been entrenched.
They also point out that the argument from competence presupposes an asymmetry that is not always real. On many subjects, voters know their own situation better than their representative, and faithfulness to a campaign pledge is a condition of trust.
A tension that institutions settle
In France, Article 27 of the 1958 Constitution provides that any imperative mandate is void, which enshrines the second conception. Other systems provide for mechanisms to recall elected officials, which bring the mandate closer to delegation.
Hanna Pitkin, in The Concept of Representation in 1967, showed that this controversy cannot be settled by a definition. Representing requires both acting in the interest of those represented and remaining responsive to what they want, two requirements that can diverge.
Where to stand
Most people do not side entirely with one camp. Representatives are often expected to keep their commitments on the subjects they announced and to exercise judgement on unforeseen questions, which combines the two conceptions.
The position also varies with trust. The more one distrusts representatives, the more one values faithfulness; the more one values deliberation, the more one accepts independence. This link explains why the preference can change with context without being inconsistent.
One question helps you place yourself: does a representative who votes against the majority view of their voters, after explaining why, betray their mandate or exercise it? Both answers defend a demanding idea of democracy.
Key points
The delegate draws legitimacy from faithfulness, the trustee from the quality of their judgement.
Each conception answers a real risk: representatives drifting away on one side, the impossibility of deliberating on the other.
Most expectations combine the two, depending on the subject and the degree of trust granted.
This article describes documented mechanisms and disagreements. It recommends no position, no party and no vote, and commits to no reading other than that of the work it cites.
And you, where do you stand?
The Civix test situates your convictions on six dimensions and matches you with one of the twelve profiles, without ever telling you what to think.
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